110th Congress S. Report 2nd Session SENATE 110- REPORT ON WHETHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING IRAQ BY U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY INTELLIGENCE INFORIVIATION together with ADDITIONAL AND IVIINORITY VIEWS June _2008. - Ordered to be printed Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of June __, 2008 SELECT COMI\/IITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE United States Senate 110°‘ Congress JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI, VICE CHAIRMAN DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CALIFORNIA JOHN WARNER, VIRGINLA RON WYDEN, OREGON CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA EVAN BAYH, INDIANA SAXBY CHAMZBLISS, GEORGIA BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND ORRIN HATCH, UTAH RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN OLYMCPIA SNOWE, MAINE SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA HARRY REID, NEVADA, EX OFFICIO MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY, EX OFFICIO CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN, EX OFFICIO JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA, EX OFFICIO W'l1ether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information I. Scope and Methodology (U) This report’s scope, as agreed to unanimously by the Committee on February 12, 2004, is to assess "whether ublic statements and re orts and testimon re ardin Ira by U.S. Government P P Y 8 8 cl _ officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information."l (U) ln order to complete this task, the Committee decided to concentrate its analysis on the statements that were central to the nation’s decision to go to war. Specifically, the Committee chose to review five major policy speeches by key Administration officials regarding the threats posed by Iraq, Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, Iraqi ties to terrorist groups, and possible consequences of a US invasion of Iraq. These include: • Vice President Richard Cheney, Speech in Tennessee to the Veterans of Foreign Wars National Convention, August 26, 2002.2 • President George W. Bush, Statement before the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002.3 • President George W. Bush, Speech in Cincinnati, October 7, 2002.4 • President George W. Bush, State of the Union address, January 28, 2003.5 • Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003.6 (U) These speeches are the best representations of how the Bush Administration communicated intelligence analysis to the Congress, the American people, and the intemational community. They are also fairly comprehensive in scope, so evaluations about whether a particular statement in a s eech was substantiated can be extra olated to cover similar statements made at similar . P . . P times. The Committee believes that these speeches would have been subject to careful review inside the \Vhite House and most were also reviewed by the intelligence community. (The drafting processes for the Secretary of State’s speech to the Security Council, and portions of the 1 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Press Release, "Chaim1an Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller Issue Statement on Intelligence Committee’s Review of Pre-War Intelligence in Iraq," February 12, 2004. 2 Transcript available at h ://www.whitehouse. ov.news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html, last visited March 21, 2008. 3 Transcript available at h ://www.whitehouse. ov.news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1,hnnl, last visited March 21, 2008. 4 Transcript available at h ://www.whitehouse. ov.news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.htm1, last visited March 21, 2008. 5 Transcript available at h ://wwwwhitehouse. ov.news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html, last visited March 2 1 , 2008. 6 Transcript available at h ://www.state. ov/secre /former/ owell/remarks/2003/17300.hnn, last visited March 2 1 , 2008. _ 1 2003 State of the Union and the President’s speech in Cincinnati, are all discussed in the Committee’s first report on pre-war Iraq intelligence, Senate Report 108-301. The Vice President’s August 2002 speech was not reviewed by the intelligence community. Intelligence officials have told the Committee that they could not find any evidence that the President’s September 2002 address to the UN General Assembly was reviewed by the intelligence community.) (U) The Committee selected particular statements from these speeches that pertained to eight categories: nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons, weapons of mass destruction (generally), methods of delivery, links to terrorism, regime intent, and assessments about the post-war situation in Iraq. The report is organized along these eight categories, with each section listing the relevant statements from the speeches. (U) This report does not include statements made prior to summer 2002 or statements made by officials of the United States Govemment beyond the top levels of the Executive Branch. At the end of each section, following analysis of the five speeches, the Committee has listed additional statements by senior officials from the same time period. Those statements that contain assertions not included in the five major policy speeches have been examined further, to determine whether they were substantiated by available intelligence. (U) To conduct this review, the Committee assembled hundreds of intelligence reports produced prior to March 19, 2003 in an effort to understand the state of intelligence analysis at the time of various speeches and statements. The Committee is fully aware that officials may have had multiple credible sources of information upon which to base statements, but has not attempted to document or analyze source materials other than the intelligence, since that is beyond the scope of this report. (U) Furthermore, the Committee reviewed only finished analytic intelligence documents, with few exceptions. This did not include intelligence reports "from the field" or less formal communications between intelligence agencies and other parts of the Executive Branch. (U) The Cornrnittee has attempted to note where disagreements existed within the Intelligence Community and where different reporting could substantiate different interpretations. In order to complete this task, however, this report focuses first on major coordinated inter-agency intelligence reports such as National Intelligence Estimates, Intelligence Community Assessments and Briefs, and other consensus products. These products are not only the most authoritative, representing the full Intelligence Community position on the issues they cover, but also tend to be widely circulated within the government. The Committee also examined assessments, reports and statements to Congress from individual intelligence agencies to address those issues for which coordinated reports were not available or where there was disagreement among agencies. (U) In addition to examining the question of whether public statements were substantiated by the underlying intelligence, the Committee’s review also addressed the extent to which statements were incomplete and where relevant Intelligence Community assessments were not made part of the public discourse. A public statement that selectively uses only that intelligence _ 2 that supports a particular policy position while ignoring or disregarding intelligence that either weakens or contradicts the position may be accurate on its face but present a slanted picture nonetheless. (U) Overlaying this issue of the selective use of intelligence is the more fundamental issue of the selective declassification of intelligence. Intelligence infonnation contained in many of the speeches analyzed in this report had to be declassified before being released publicly. The Executive Branch has the prerogative to classify information to protect national security, and unlike Congress the Executive Branch can declassify information relatively easily. Until the Congress sought and obtained the release of an unclassified version of the key judgments of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s presumed weapons of mass destruction programs, the analytical judgments of the Intelligence Community on these matters were classified. The collected intelligence underlying these judgments remained classified until after the invasion of Iraq. Few, if any, of the Intelligence Community’s assessments on Iraq’s links to terrorism, the intent of the Iraqi regime, projected post-war conditions, or other relevant matters contained in the statements of senior officials were publicly released before the war. This ability of the Executive Branch to unilaterally declassify and divulge intelligence infonnation at a time, place, and in a manner of its choosing must also be taken into account when evaluating policymakers’ use of intelligence information. _ 3 II. Nuclear Weapons • "The Iraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "But we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "What he wants is time and more time to husband his resources, to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons programs, and to gain possession of nuclear arms.” - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about its nuclear program — weapons design, procurement logs, experiment data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign assistance. Iraq employs capable nuclear scientists and technicians. It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year. And Iraq’s state-controlled media has reported numerous meetings between Saddam Hussein and his nuclear scientists, leaving little doubt about his continued appetite for these weapons." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "But Saddam Hussein has detied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has a — nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "The Iraqi regime has violated all of these obligations. It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists. . .Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past. Iraq has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weap0ns." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 _ 4 • "If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof- the smoking gun - that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "After eleven years during which we have tried containment, sanctions, inspection, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons and is increasing his capabilities to make more. And he is moving ever closer to developing a nuclear weapon." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "We could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to black;mail the world. But I’m convinced that is a hope against all evidence." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "To spare himself, he agreed to systematically disarm of all weapons of mass destruction. For the next twelve years, he systematically violated that agreement. He pursued chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his country. Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these weapons — not economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even cruise missile strikes on his military facilities." - President George W Bush, State ofthe Union Address, January 29, 2003 • "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high—strengt.h aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production." · President George W Bush, State ofthe Union Address, January 29, 2003 • "We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, we have more than a decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb. He is so determined that he has made repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from eleven different countries, even after inspections resumed." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes and we all know that there are differences of opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other experts, and the Iraqis themselves, argue that they are really to produce the rocket _ 5 bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple rocket launcher." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last summer showed that Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be used to balance gas centrifuge rotors. One of these companies also had been involved in a failed effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminum tubes into Iraq." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "We also have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is attempting to acquire magnets and high—speed balancing machines. Both items can be used in a gas centrifuge program to enrich uranium." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 (U) In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of State indicated that the Iraqi government had an active nuclear weapons program. The President and the Secretary of State both indicated that this nuclear weapons program had continued even while intemational weapons inspectors were in Iraq. Vice President’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002) (U) In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated that the Iraqi regime had resumed pursuit of a nuclear weapons development program, and said "many of us are convinced that Saddam Hussein will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon". He also said that "Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons", and that the Iraqi regime "continue[s] to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago."7 (U) In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the intelligence community produced a number of coordinated assessments regarding possible Iraqi nuclear programs. These assessments consistently concluded that the International Atomic Energy Agency (LAEA) and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) had destroyed or neutralized Iraq’s pre-Gulf War nuclear infrastructure, and that Iraq did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons pro gram.8 (U) These assessments were also consistent in assessing that Iraq had maintained some of the intellectual capital and physical infrastructure necessary for a nuclear weapons program, and that Iraq continued to procure "dual-use" technologies, with both nuclear and non-nuclear potential 7 White House Transcript, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103'd National Convention, August 26, 2002. 8 Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee Report, Reconstitution of Iraq ’s Nuclear Weapons Program: An Update, October 1997; National Intelligence Council Memorandum., Current WMD Capabilities, October 1998; Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee Report, Reconstitution of Iraq ’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Post Desert Fox, June 1999; Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq.· Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities, December 2000; and National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001. (These reports are summarized in Report on the US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004). _ 6 uses. They agreed that if Iraq decided to restart a nuclear weapons program, with proper foreign assistance it could produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon within five to seven years, and that if Iraq in some way acquired adequate fissile material from a foreign source, it could produce a nuclear weapon within one year. The December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on foreign missile developments also noted that "Recent Iraqi procurements. . .suggest possible preparation for a renewed uranium enrichment program,” a slight shift in the intelligence community’s judgments, but still consistent with the judgment that Iraq did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program.9 (U) The intelligence community’s collective judgment that Iraq did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program did not change until the publication of the October 2002 NIE on Iraqi WMD programs, which was the next NIE to address the topic. However, some individual agencies shifted their perspectives before this point. In April 2001, the CIA noted that Iraq’s attempts to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other dual-use equipment suggested that a reconstitution effort might be underway. This judgment was included in several other CIA assessments.lO In August 2002 the CIA published a paper on Iraqi WMD capabilities (Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat), which concluded that these procurement activities indicated that the Iraqi government had restarted its nuclear weapons program. ll (U) The Defense Intelligence Agency produced several similar assessments in 2002, noting in a May 2002 report that "Although there is no firm evidence of a current nuclear weapon design effort, we judge that continued procurement of dual-use nuclear-related items, key personnel assigned to nuclear weapon-capable sites, construction at nuclear facilities, and Saddam’s interactions with the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission all indicate that Saddam has not abandoned the nuclear weapon pro gram."l2 (U) The Department of Energy (DOE) disagreed with the CIA’s conclusions regarding the aluminum tubes, and assessed that it was more likely that the tubes were intended for a different use, such as a conventional rocket program.13 Based on other evidence, including Saddam’s 9 rm. l° Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Iraq - Purchases Could Revive Nuclear Program (SC_No: PASS SEIB 01- 083CHX), April 10, 2001; CIA, Iraq: New Ejfort to Get Centryfuge Tubes, July 2001; Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Iraq: Nuclear-Related Procurement Ejforts, October 18, 2001; Senior Executive Intelligence Brief Iraq: Seeking to Rebuild Enrichment Capability, November 2001; CIA, Iraq: Centrtfige-based Uranium Enrichment Program Before and After Gubf War, November 2001; CLA Senior Executive Memorandum, December 15, 2001; CIA, Iraq: Status ofthe Nuclear Program, January 11, 2002; CLA, Iraq: Status of Baghdad ’s Uranium Enrichment Program, March 2002. U CLA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002. 12 DIA EH, Baghdad apparentbv has increased its activity at former and suspect nuclear sites, January 15, 2002; DIA Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraq 's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs: Post-9-1 1 September, January 2002; DIA Information Paper, Proly’eration of Nuclear Weapons, April 15, 2002; DIA Information Paper, Comparison of NBC and missiles programs in Iraq, Iran and Syria, September 10, 2002; DIA, Iraq — Key WIMD Facilities An Operational Support Study, September 2002; DIA,Iraq: Nuclear Program Handbook (DI-1610-81-01), Ddense Intelligence Assessment, May 2002; DIA, Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Weapon Program, September 2002. B Department of Energy Daily Intelligence Highlight, Iraq: High Strength Aluminum Tube Procurement, April 11, 2001; Department of Energy Technical Intelligence Note, Iraq’s Gas Centrifuge Program: Is Reconstitution Underway?, August 17, 2001. . _ 7 meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, and possible attempts to procure uranium from Niger, the DOE assessed in July 2002 that Saddam Hussein might be attempting to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program, but suggested that the evidence was not conclusive.14 (U) The Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State/INR) disagreed with the CIA that Iraq had restarted a nuclear weapons program, and concurred with the DOE that the aluminum tubes were probably intended for other purposes. This view was included in congressional testimony in September 2002, but State/INR did not publish any reports on the aluminum tubes outside of the State Department until after publication of the October 2002 NIE.15 _ Several of these intelligence agencies also made reference to assessments by the National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC) regarding the aluminum tubes. Testimony by the Director of Central Intelligence to Congress stated that NGIC judged that "Iraq’s dimensional requirements for the tubes are far stricter than necessary for rocket casings." A later memo from State/INR said that "the IAEA and - pertinent nuclear—technical experts have concluded independently that the aluminum tubes are not intended for Iraq’ s nuclear program and are consistent with rocket casings. . .DOE and DoD’s National Ground Intelligence Center (N GIC) concur on this assessment, though NGIC does not share most of the other DOE views on tactical rockets."l6 (U) According to a DIA report, the intelligence community continued to assess that it would take five to seven years from the commencement of a revived nuclear program for the Iraqi govemment to indigenously produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. This same report repeated the assessment that a nuclear weapon could be constructed much faster if adequate fissile material was acquired from a foreign source, though an earlier CIA assessment noted that "we have not detected a dedicated Iraqi effort to obtain fissile material abroad."17 President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) (U) In the President’s address to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that Iraq continued to develop weapons of mass destruction, and indicated that Iraq had an ongoing nuclear weapons program. Specifically, he referred to Iraqi efforts to purchase aluminum tubes, Iraqi efforts to conceal infomation about its pre-Gulf War nuclear program, and meetings between Saddam Hussein and Iraqi nuclear scientists. He noted that Iraq possessed some of the intellectual capital and physical infrastructure that would be necessary for a nuclear weapons M Department of Energy Daily Intelligence Highlight, Nuclear Reconstitution Ejforts Underway?, July 22, 2002. 15 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence transcript of Hearing on Iraq, September 17, 2002; Report on the US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. 16 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence transcript of Hearing on Iraq, September 17, 2002; State/INR Memorandum, Iraq: Quest for Aluminum Tubes, October 9, 2002. 17 CIA, Senior Executive Memorandum, December 15, 2001; DIA, Iraq.· Nuclear Program Handbook (DI-1610-81- 01), Defense Intelligence Assessment, May 2002 (citing the views of the intelligence community). _ 8 program, and said that if Iraq could "acquire iissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year."18 (U) As noted above, the intelligence community had assessed for years that while Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure had been destroyed or neutralized by the IAEA and the UN, Iraq still possessed some of the physical infrastructure and scientific personnel that would be necessary for reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. Though the intelligence community as a whole had not yet concluded that a nuclear weapons program was underway, some (though not all) intelligence agencies believed that Iraq’s attempts to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes, along with supporting evidence such as Saddam’s meetings with Iraqi nuclear science personnel, indicated that the nuclear program was in fact being reconstituted. (U) Intelligence community analysts generally believed that the Iraqi govemment’s failure to provide certain evidence and documents regarding its pre-1991 nuclear program indicated that the Iraqi govemment was attempting to conceal this information. However, this conclusion was not cited by the intelligence community as compelling evidence for a reconstituted, post-Gulf War nuclear weapons program.19 (U) Numerous intelligence assessments made reference to open source information showing that Saddam met with personnel from the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC).2° (U) At the time of the President’s address to the General Assembly, the intelligence community had not changed its judgment that it would take Iraq at least several years to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon (‘five to seven years’ was the commonly cited timeframe, though a September 2002 DIA report judged that it could be done in four)2l, and that Iraq could build a nuclear weapon within one year if it in some way acquired an adequate amount of iissile material from a foreign source. President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002) (U) In the President’s speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, he stated that the Iraqi regime was "seeking nuclear weapons", and that Saddam Hussein was "moving ever closer to developing a nuclear weapon". He reiterated earlier statements about Saddam holding "numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists”, and attempting to "purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges”. He also said that Iraq was "rebui1ding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the 2past", and that "the evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons pro gram."2 18 White House Transcript, President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002. 19 CIA, Iraq: Continuing To Stonewall IAEA, July 10, 1998; DIA, Iraq: Nuclear Program Handbook (DI-1610-81- 01), Defense Intelligence Assessment, May 2002; and CIA, Iraq: Status ofthe Nuclear Program, January 11, 2002. 20 DOE, Iraq: Nuclear Reconstitution Efforts Underway? , July 22, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Questions on Nuclear Timeline, September 11, 2002; Report on the US. Intelligence Community 's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. 21 DIA, Iraq — Key WMD Facilities An Operational Support Study, September 2002. 22 White House Transcript, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. _ 9 (U) The President also repeated his statement that if the Iraqi regime came to possess highly emiched uranium, "it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year." Additionally, he suggested that there was clear evidence that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapon, declaring that "facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof- the smoking grm — that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud." He concluded that "we could wait and hope that Saddam does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world. But I’m convinced that is a hope against all evidence."23 (U) In the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the intelligence community expressed the majority view (with all agencies except State/INR concurring) that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. This conclusion was based on three primary bodies of evidence: Iraqi procurement attempts (primarily of aluminum tubes, but also including other dual-use technologies, such as magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools), apparent regime efforts to reestablish Iraq’s cadre of weapons personnel, and apparent activity at several suspected nuclear weapons sites.24 (U) State/INR dissented from the majority view, and stated in the NIE that the available evidence did "not add up to a compelling case for reconstitution" of an Iraqi nuclear weapons program. The DOE dissented from the majority view that the high-strength aluminum tubes were intended for use in a nuclear program, but concurred with the majority judgment that reconstitution was underway.25 (U) In addition to discussing Iraqi attempts to procure aluminum tubes and other dual-use technologies, the NIE described meetings between Saddam Hussein and IAEC personnel. The NIE, like several earlier DIA reports, also discussed construction at facilities that might have nuclear applications Construction at sites known to have been part of Iraq’s pre-Gulf War nuclear weapons program was mentioned in earlier assessments (though not specifically in the NIE).26 (U) State/IN`R’s altemative views, which were incorporated in the NIE, said that State/ INR accepted "the view of technical experts at the Department of Energy" who concluded that the aluminum tubes were "poorly suited" for a nuclear weapons program. The altemative views also cast doubt on the judgment that other dual-use procurement efforts were related to a nuclear program, and went on to say that "the information we have on Iraqi nuclear personnel does not appear consistent with a coherent effort to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program."27 23 rbrd. 24 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq 's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. Committee staff were also permitted to view a one-page summary of the NIE, which was prepared for the President. This one-page summary stated that "INR judges that the evidence indicates, at most, a limited Iraqi nuclear reconstitution effort." 25 rbrd. 26 DIA, Iraq: Nuclear Program Handbook, May 2002; DIA, Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Weapon Program, September 2002; DIA, Iraq -— Key WMD Facilities An Operational Support Study, September 2002; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002; Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq: Steadibr Pursuing WMD Capabilities, December 2000. 27 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 10 (U) The majority view of the NIE assessed that Iraq would be able to produce a nuclear weapon in five to seven years, and posited a "much less likely scenario" in which production time could be shortened to three to five years. The majority view also assessed that if Iraq acquired fissile material from an outside source that production time could be "witbin several months to a year", but noted that Iraq did not appear to have a "systematic effort to acquire foreign fissile materials from Russia [or] other sources." State/INR said that it could not predict when Iraq might acquire a nuclear weapon, since it lacked persuasive evidence of a reconstituted nuclear pro gram.28 President ’s State ofthe Union Address (January 29, 2003) (U) In the President’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he stated that Iraq had pursued nuclear weapons even while weapons inspectors were in Iraq. He also said that the Iraqi regime had attempted to purchase aluminum tubes that could be used in a nuclear program, and that "the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."29 (U) While the intelligence community assessed that Iraq had initially attempted to continue its nuclear weapons program following the imposition of post-Gulf War sanctions, most agencies believed that the IAEA and UNSCOM had succeeded in destroying or neutralizing Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure, and that the regime did not resume its pursuit of nuclear weapons until December 1998, when UNSCOM inspectors left the coruitry. As noted above, State/INR did not believe that reconstitution had begun at all.30 (U) The October 2002 NIE contained an annex on the high-strength aluminum tubes. Although all the intelligence agencies agreed that the aluminum tubes were a dual-use technology, DOE and State/INR assessed that it was unlikely that the tubes were being used for nuclear weapons- related purposes. Other agencies concurred with the majority view, which cited the aluminum tubes as the primary evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons program. Neither the concurring nor dissenting agencies changed their view between the publication of the NIE and the invasion of Iraq.31 (U) An unclassified British white paper from September 2002 had assessed that Iraq had sought large quantities of natural (non-enriched) uranium from Africa. This was echoed by a statement in the NIE, which said "lraq also began vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons." This was not cited by the NIE as key evidence for an ongoing nuclear program. 2* ibid. 29 White House Transcript, President Delivers "State ofthe Union January 28, 2003. 30 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002; Prepared Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet Before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 17, 2002; and Report on the UTS. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. 31 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002, and Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. _ ll State/INR’s alternative views said that "the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR’s assessment, highly dubious."32 (U) The CIA’s comments and assessments about the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting were inconsistent, and at times contradictory, following the publication of the NIE. Neither State/INR, nor the DIA, nor the DOE shifted their assessments regarding this issue between the publication of the NIE and the invasion of Iraq.33 (U) Intelligence assessments regarding the uranium reporting and the coordination process for the State of the Union address are discussed in more detail in previous Committee reports. (Senate Reports 108-301 and 109-331). Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) (U) In the Secretary of State’s February 2003 address to the United Nations Security Council, he stated that Saddam Hussein was detemiined to acquire nuclear weapons, and argued that Iraq had not abandoned its pre-Gulf War weapons program. He specifically referred to Iraqi attempts to procure dual-use teclmologies, including aluminum tubes, magnets, and high-speed balancing machines. (U) The Secretary of State said that "most U.S. experts" believed that the aluminum tubes were intended to be part of a nuclear weapons program, and acknowledged that "other experts", as well as the Iraqi govemment, had argued that the tubes were intended for use in conventional rocket programs. (U) United States intelligence agencies continued to differ over the intended purpose of the aluminum tubes - State/INR and the DOE continued to disagree with the majority view and assessed that procurement efforts were "not clearly linked to a nuclear end use." (U) The intelligence community also assessed that the Iraqi government was seeking to purchase certain other dual-use technologies, and State/INR continued to disagree with the majority view that these technologies were part of a nuclear weapons program. (U) The Secretary of State did not mention apparent activity at former nuclear facilities or reports about Iraq acquiring uranium from Africa in his address to the Security Council. Additional Statements 32 Joint Intelligence Committee of the United Kingdom, Iraq ’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, September 24, 2002; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002; Report on the US. Intelligence Community 's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 108-301, July 9, 2004. 33Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq 's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. _ 12 • "[T]he issue’s not inspectors. The issue is that [Saddam Hussein] has chemical weapons and he’s used them. The issue is that he’s developing and has biological weapons. The issue is that he’s pursuing nuclear weapons...[H]e is actively pursuing nuclear weapons at this time..." - Vice President Dick Cheney, Late Edition, March 24, 2002 • (Question: Can we rule out right now Saddam’s having a nuclear weapon?) "I would not want to give you an intelligence judgment on that. Our best information right now is that he is working hard on [developing nuclear weapons], but we cannot confirm that he has one. But we are absolutely certain that he continues to try to develop one or obtain one." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Fox News Sunday, September 8, 2002 • "With respect to nuclear weapons, we are quite confident that [Saddam Hussein] continues to try to pursue the technology that would allow him to develop a nuclear weapon.iWhether he could do it in one, five, six or seven, eight years is something that people can debate about, but what nobody can debate about is the fact that he still has the incentive, he still intends to develop those kinds of weapons. " — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Fox News Sunday, September 8, 2002 • "[Saddam] now is trying, through his illicit procurement network, to acquire the equipment he needs to be able to enrich uranium to make the bombs." — Wce President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, September 8, 2002 • "[Saddam Hussein’s] regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Service Committee, September 18, 2002 (U) The above statements are all consistent with the five policy speeches analyzed. The statements below differ in significant ways. • "We do know that he is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon. We do know that there have been shipments going into Iran, for instance -- into Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to -- high-quality aluminum tubes that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs. We know that he has the infrastructure, nuclear scientists to make a nuclear weapon." — National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8, 2002 (U) On September 8, 2002, the National Security Advisor said that the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq "are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs". Although both the CIA and DIA had assessed that the aluminum tubes were intended for a nuclear weapons program (with the CIA noting that the tubes were "best suited" for centrifuges, and that other explanations were "inconsistent with the total body of intelligence"), the DOE had assessed that this was unlikely, _ 13 and had published intelligence reports explaining why it was possible (and, in the DOE’s view, more likely) that the tubes were intended to be used to build conventional rockets.34 • "His regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons. They have the knowledge of how to produce nuclear weapons, and designs for at least two different nuclear devices.` They have a team of scientists, technicians and engineers in place, as well as the infrastructure needed to build a weapon. Very likely all they need to complete a weapon is fissile material-and they are, at this moment, seeking that material-both from foreign sources and the capability to produce it indigenously." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 19, 2002 (U) On September 19, 2002, the Secretary of Defense stated that Iraq possessed designs for at least two nuclear devices. He also stated that the Iraqi government was seeking fissile material from foreign sources. - Intelligence obtained after the Gulf War indicated that Iraq had developed two designs for nuclear weapons. Both a arently failed to meet key Iraqi objectives — the smaller of the two had an estimated y and the larger of the two, which had an estimated yield of , could not be delivered by missile.36 Although the intelligence community did not assess that Iraq was engaged in a systematic effort to acquire fissile material from abroad, a September 2002 DIA report noted that "a sensitive source indicates that since inspectors left in 1998, Iraq has been trying to acquire highly enriched uranium."37 • "But we now have irrefutable evidence that he has once again set up and reconstituted his program, to take uranium, to enrich it to sufficiently high grade, so that it will function as the base material as a nuclear weapon." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Speech in Casper, Wyoming, September 20, 2002 (quoted by the Associated Press) (U) In September 2002 the Vice President stated that there was "irrefutable evidence" that Iraq had reconstituted a nuclear weapons program. As noted, several intelligence agencies assessed that reconstitution was underway, but the Department of Energy assessed that the evidence was less conclusive (State/ INR agreed with the Department of Energy, but had not published any reports on the topic outside of the State Department at that point).38 34 Department of Energy Daily Intelligence Highlight, Iraq: High Strength Aluminum Tube Procurement, April ll, 2001; Department of Energy, Iraq 's Gas Cenmyixge Program: Is Reconstitution Underway?, August 17, 2001, p. 12; DIA, Iraq: Nuclear Program Handbook (DI—1 61 0-8 1 -01), Defense Intelligence Assessment, May 2002; Department of Energy Daily Intelligence Highlight, Nuclear Reconstitution Underway?, July 22, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002. 35 A lciloton is a measure of explosive force equivalent to 1000 tons of TNT. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima is generally estimated to have exploded with a force of 12-15 kilotons. 36 The post-Gulf War reporting is summarized in the October 2002 NIE, which was published a few weeks after the Secretary’s testimony. 37 DIA, Iraq ’s Reemerging Nuclear Weapons Program, September 2002. 38 Department of Energy Daily Intelligence Highlight, Iraq: High Strength Aluminum Tube Procurement, April 11, 2001; Department of Energy Daily Intelligence Highlight, Nuclear Reconstitution Underway?, July 22, 2002; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence transcript of Hearing on Iraq, September 17, 2002. 14 • "It is going to be cheaper and less costly to do it now than it will be to wait a year or two years or three years until he’s developed even more deadly weapons, perhaps nuclear weapons." — Vice President Richard Cheney, Meet the Press, March 16, 2003 (U) In March 2003 the Vice President suggested that it was possible that Iraq could develop nuclear weapons within one to three years. The majority view of the NIE concluded that unless it acquired fissile material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a nuclear weapon for five to seven years. The NIE described a "much less likely" scenario in which Iraq could produce enough fissile material for a weapon in three to five years, and also assessed that if the Iraqi regime acquired sufficient fissile material from abroad, it could build a weapon in "several months to a year." While most intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq had made a few efforts to acquire fissile material from abroad, the NIE noted that Iraq had apparently not instituted a systematic effort to acquire foreign fissile materials.39 • "We know that based on intelligence that he has been very, very good at hiding these kinds of efforts. He’s had years to get good at it and we know he has been absolutely devoted to trying to acquire nuclear weapons. And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons. I think Mr. El-Baradei frankly is wrong. And I think if you look at the track record of the International Atomic Energy Agency and this kind of issue, especially where Iraq’s concerned, they have consistently underestimated or missed what it was Saddam Hussein was doing. I don’t have any reason to believe they’re any more valid this time than they’ve been in the past." - Vice President Dick Cheney, Meet the Press, March 16, 2003 (U) In March 2003 the Vice President also said that Iraq had reconstituted nuclear weapons. Elsewhere in the same interview he indicated that Iraq did not yet possess nuclear weapons, and that "it’s only a matter of time until he [Saddam Hussein] acquires nuclear weapons." No intelligence agency ever assessed that Iraq had reconstituted nuclear weapons. In an interview on September 13, 2003, the Vice President said that he had misspoken, and had meant to say "nuclear weapons capability", rather than "nuclear weapons". Conclusions (U) Conclusion 1: Statements by the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor regarding a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program were generally substantiated by intelligence community estimates, but did not convey the substantial disagreements that existed in the intelligence community. Prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, some intelligence agencies assessed that the Iraqi government was reconstituting a nuclear weapons program, while others disagreed or expressed doubts about the evidence. The Estimate itself expressed the majority view that the program was being reconstituted, but included clear dissenting views from the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which argued that reconstitution was not underway, and the Department of Energy, which argued that aluminum tubes sought by Iraq were probably not intended for a nuclear program. 39 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. _ 15 Postwar Findings (U) Postwar findings revealed that Iraq ended its nuclear weapons program in 1991, and that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively declined aiier that date. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) found no evidence that Saddam Hussein ever attempted to restart a nuclear weapons program, although the Group did find that he took steps to retain the intellectual capital generated during the program. That intellectual capital decayed between 1991 and 2003, however, and the ISG found no evidence that the relevant scientists were involved in renewed weapons work. (U) Postwar findings confirmed that the high-strength aluminum tubes sought by Iraq had been intended for a conventional rocket program, and found no evidence that other dual-use technologies (magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools) were intended for use in a nuclear weapons program. Various ongoing activities at former nuclear sites were apparently unrelated to any weapons program, and construction observed at the al-Tahadi high- voltage and electromagnetic facility also had no apparent connection to any nuclear weapons program. (U) P4qstwar surveys found no evidence that Iraq sought uranium from any foreign sources alter 1 991 . 40 Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Report 109-331, September 8, 2006. _ 16 IH. Biological Weapons • "The Iraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents." - Wce President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "What he wants is time and more time to husband his resources, to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons programs, and to gain possession of nuclear arms." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups. The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Ir1 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq’s military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. The inspectors, however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that amount. This is a massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for, and capable of killing millions." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons. Every chemical and biological weapon that Iraq has or makes is a direct violation of the truce that ended the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Yet, Saddam Hussein has chosen to build and keep these weapons despite intemational sanctions, U.N. demands, and isolation from the civilized world." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "After eleven years during which we have tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons, and is increasing his capabilities to make more." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Twelve years ago, Saddam Hussein faced the prospect of being the last casualty in a war he had started and lost. To spare himself, he agreed to disarm of all weapons of mass destruction. For the next 12 years, he systematically violated that agreement. He pursued chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his country. Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these weapons — not economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even cruise missile strikes 17 on his military facilities." — President George W Bush, State ofthe Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late l990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs. These are designed to produce germ warfare agents, and can be moved from place to a place to evade inspections. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed them." — President George W Bush, State ofthe Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "We know, we know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was dispersing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agent to various locations, distributing them to various locations in western Iraq .... Most of the launchers and warheads had been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved every one to four weeks to escape detection." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq’s biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "Let me take you inside that intelligence file and share with you what we know from eyewitness accounts. We have first-hand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are designed to evade detection by inspectors. In a matter of months, they can produce a quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf War." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "Although Iraq’s mobile production program began in the mid-1990s, UN inspectors at the time only had vague hints of such programs. Confirmation came later, in the year 2000. The source was an eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these facilities. He actually was present during biological agent production runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. l2 technicians died from exposure to biological agents." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "A second source. An Iraqi civil engineer in a position to know the details of the program confirmed the existence of transportable facilities moving on trailers." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "A third source, also in a position to know, reported in summer, 2002, that Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems mounted on road-trailer units and on rail cars." 18 - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "Finally, a fourth source. An Iraqi major who defected coniirmed that Iraq has mobile biological research laboratories in addition to the production facilities I mentioned earlier." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile, biological agent factories." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "Ladies and gentlemen, these are sophisticated facilities. For example, they can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin. In fact, they can produce enough dry, biological agent in a single month to kill thousands upon thousands of people." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of biological agents causing diseases such as gas gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera, camelpox, and hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. And he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. • "We also have sources who tell us that since the l980s, Saddam’s regime has been experimenting on human beings to perfect its biological or chemical weapons." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Speech to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003. Vice President ’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002) (U) The Vice President’s speech stated generally that Iraq had been "enhancing its capabilities in the field of’ biological agents and that Saddam Hussein wanted "time and more time to husband his resources [and] to invest in his ongoing biological weapons programs." (U) The intelligence community produced a number of coordinated and single-agency reports on Iraq’s biological weapons program after United Nations inspectors left Iraq in the l990s. One such report was the December 2000 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. The ICA noted that "Our main judgment about what _ 19 remains of Iraq’s original WMD programs, agents stockpiles, and delivery systems have changed little: Iraq retains stockpiles of chemical and biological agents and munitions."44 - The ICA also judged that Iraq had largely rebuilt its biological weapons facilities that raised ana1ysts’ concern about Iraq’s intentions, but could not determine "whether Iraq is diverting these or other of its many pharmaceutical, vaccine, or pesticide plants to produce BW agents." Similarly, the ICA reported that _ Iraq had built a new castor oil plant that "could easily" be used to produce the toxin ricin. (U) Consistent with most contemporaneous intelligence reports, the ICA reported that UN inspectors, and the intelligence community, did not believe that Iraq had destroyed its previous biological weapons and agent. It also assessed that Iraq had "taken steps to bolster" its biological weapons research and development program. (U) While the Vice President’s speech did not reference the mobile biological laboratories, the biological weapons section of the ICA began with such biological weapons production plants. This portion of the ICA was based on "credible US military reporting from a single source" who was described in the Comrnittee’s previous report as being the asylum seeker codenamed "CU`RVEBALL."42 The ICA, like other finished intelligence at the time, did not cite the source by name. The ICA cited this source as saying that Iraq had "developed a clandestine production capability ... which has the potential to turn out several hundred tons of unconcentrated BW agent per year." According to the source, Iraq had constructed seven transportable biological weapons plants. (U) An August 10, 2001 CIA assessment, Developing Biological Weapons as a Strategic Deterrent, stated that "Iraq is attempting to address its regional security concerns by developing weapons of mass destruction and is focusing on biological warfare (BW) agents as a strategic deterrent to its enemies’ conventional and non- conventional forces." The agency assessed that "Iraq does not require outside assistance to produce BW, which can be easily hidden from weapons inspectors and national technical collection means." The paper also said, "we assess Baghdad already has a thriving biological weapons program to augment any stockpiles it hid from weapons inspectors."43 (U) A December 15, 2001 CIA report, The Iraqi Threat, stated that "Iraq maintains an active and capable BW program that includes research, production, and weaponization of BW agents." The paper assessed that anthrax and botulinum were the most likely candidate agents for weaponization.44 (U) An August 2002 DIA assessment, Iraq: Biological Wagfare Program Handbook, judged that: 44 December 2000 Intelligence Community Assessment, (U) Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities. ICA 2000- 007HCX. 42 See Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, US. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 2004, p. 144. 43 August 10, 2001 CIA intelligence assessment, Developing Biological Weapons as a Strategic Deterrent (CLAINESAF IA 2001-200721) 44 A December 15, 2001 SPWR, The Iraqi Threat (SPWRl2l501-07) _ 20 Iraq is assessed to have an active BW research and development program. Baghdad has reportedly rebuilt its full offensive BW program in well-concealed, underground, mobile or difficult-to-locate facilities applying lessons learned during the former UNSCOM inspection process to prevent penetration by foreign intelligence services. The Iraqi biological warfare (BW) program is assessed to continue today despite Iraq’s claims to have destroyed its BW agents and weapons completely in 1991. Numerous sources have stated that Iraq still has stockpiles of BW agents. DIA cannot rule out Iraqi possession of agents produced before or during Operation Desert Storm or in the years since the Gulf War. (U) This DIA paper also repeated assessments that Iraq "may retain" biological weapons munitions; that it "has maintained or developed the indigenous capability to almost completely support its BW program;" and that Iraq did not adequately cooperate with UN inspectors.45 President’s Speecli to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) (U) The President commented in his September 2002 speech to the United Nations that "Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons." (U) This statement is consistent with those in the Vice President’s August 2002 speech described above. President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October Z 2002) (U) The President’s Cincinnati speech included statements that Iraq "possesses and produces" biological weapons and mentioned "surveillance photos" of rebuilt facilities. He cited Iraqi admissions that it had previously produced more than 30,000 liters of biological agents, and that UN inspectors’ views were that Iraq "likely produced two to four times that amount" that had not been accounted for. The President also stated that Saddam Hussein was "increasing his capabilities to make more" such weapons. (U) The October 2002 Iraq weapons of mass destruction NIE was issued shortly prior to the Cincinnati speech. It represented a shift in the IC’s judgments about Iraq’s biological weapons program from what had been presented in previous reports, and did not contain the uncertainties that were expressed in previous IC assessments about what was known about the BW program.46 The NIE’s key judgments were that all key elements of Iraq’s biological weapons program were active and more advanced than before the Gulf War. The judgments speciically stated that: 45 August 2002 DIA assessment, Iraq: Biological Warfare Program Handbook (DI-1650-63-02). 46 For more discussion on the changes between the 2002 NIE and previous reports, see Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, UTS. Intelligence Community ’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, July 2004. _ 21 • We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives (emphasis added); • Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability; and • Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents; these facilities can evade detection and are highly survivable. Within several days these units probably could produce an amotmt of agent equal to the total that Iraq produced in the years prior to the Gulf war.47 (U) The body of the NIE noted that "Iraq’s BW program, however, continues to be difficult to penetrate and access" and stated that "we do not have specific information on the types of weapons, agent, or stockpiles Baghdad has at its disposal."48 (U) The NIE included a passage that "Only after UNSCOM confronted Baghdad with irrefutable evidence of excessive growth media procurement did Iraq admit that it had an offensive BW program and had made 30,000 liters of concentrated biological weapons agents. Even then, UNSCOM estimates that Iraq’s production of anthrax spores and botulinum toxin could have been two to four times higher than claimed by Baghdad."49 (U) The President’s statement on "surveillance photos" of rebuilt facilities was not specific, but the October 2002 NIE included two images of possible BW facilities and text that those, and other, facilities had been renovated or expanded. (U) Other assessments produced by the Intelligence Community prior to the President’s speech also contained assessments that Iraq possessed and was producing biological weapons and was . increasing its capabilities in this regard. President’s State ofthe Union Address (January 28, 2003) (U) In this speech, the President repeated the statement that Iraq had pursued biological weapons and continued to do S0. These statements are consistent with those discussed above. (U) Two notable intelligence products on Iraq’s biological weapons program were issued between the President’s Cincinnati speech and the State of the Union address. A November l3, 2002 CIA report assessed that "Baghdad has a broad range of lethal and incapacitating agents .... Iraq probably possesses at least 20 to 25 different microbes or toxins for possible BW use."5° Another CIA paper, produced on January 18, 2003, repeated the central themes of the October 47 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October l, 2002, pp. 6-7. *8 Ibid, at 36. 49 While not from a finished intelligence product, a briefing book prepared by the CIA in May 2002 for the Principles’ Committee of the National Security Council said that "Iraq probably produced 2-to-4 times the amount of BW agent it claimed to the UN." 50 Iraq: Biological Warfare Agents Pose Growing Threat to US Interests (CIAWIZNPAC IA 2002-060CX), _ 22 NIE and stated that "We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and could quickly produce and weaponize many, including botulinum toxin and anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives."5 1 Mobile Biological Weapons Laboratories (U) Unlike his speeches discussed above, President Bush referred in the State of the Union to Iraq’s mobile biological weapons laboratories. Citing three Iraqi defectors, the President said that "in the late 1990s, Iraq had several mobile biological weapons labs. These are designed to produce genn warfare agents, and can be moved from place to a place to evade inspections." (U) As was described above, the intelligence community had reporting starting in March 2000 on Iraq’s purported mobile biological weapons labs from the Iraqi asylum seeker known as CURVE BALL. The information came to the Defense Intelligence Agency through its relationship with a liaison service that interviewed CURVE BALL. (U) Finished intelligence reporting on Iraq’s mobile biological laboratories began in the spring of 2000 and continued through the beginning of the war. The DIA and CIA each wrote numerous reports. One early exarnple was a May 19, 2000 DIA report, Iraq: Biological WaU'are Program, which stated, in part: Baghdad reportedly has developed mobile biological agent production facilities to mask ongoing production efforts. This project, allegedly the most ambitious BW- related Iraqi denial-and-deception effort thus far, will complicate identifying Iraq’s offensive BW infrastructure. 2 (U) Similar reports were issued through 2000, with a December 2000 NIE, Worldwide Biological Wadfare Programs: Trends and Prospects - Update, that noted: Earlier this year, credible reporting described construction of transportable BW agent production plants, BW agent production in some of these mobile plants, and maintenance of other fixed BW production facilities. We assess this reporting to be credible because of the speciicity of the source’s information and the fact that much of it has been corroborated by other intelligence. Although we cannot confirm that BW agent production is under way at this time, the existence of transportable BW agent plants and other fixed facilities gives Iraq the capability to produce BW agents on demand. 51 January 18, 2003 SPWR, Terrorism: CBRN Capabilities of Al-Qa ’ida and Iraq and the Poison Network in Northeastern Iran, Including Botulinum Toxin Ejforts (SPWR01 1803-09) 52 May 19, 2000 DLA Military Intelligence Digest entitled, Iraq: Biological Warfare Program. _ 23 (U) A December 14, 2000 joint report by the DCI Nonproliferation Center, the National Imagery Mapping agency (N IMA, now known as the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, or NGA), and the DIA entitled, New Evidence of Continuing Iraq Biological Warfare,53 stated: A source seeking asylum in the West has provided details of a continuing offensive bio- logical warfare (BW) program in Iraq. The source described not only maintenance of known BW-related facilities but also construction of transportable BW agent production plants and production of BW agents in these plants beginning in 1997. Although we cannot confirm that BW agent production is under way, the Intelligence Community (IC) assesses this reporting to be credible because the source has provided a wealth of specific detail, much of which we have been able to corroborate with other intelligence. This Defense Humint Service reporting has provided significant insights into many facets of Iraq’s BW program. Despite a decade of international efforts to disarm Iraq, the new information suggests that Baghdad has continued its offensive BW program by establishing a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability. (U) An October 10, 2001 CIA assessment estimated that the mobile laboratories could "far exceed the approximately 300,000 liters of unconcentrated agent it declared to have produced during the entire length of its BW program before the Gulf war."54 (U) The reports on Iraq’s mobile laboratories were primarily based on CURVE BALL, but some referred to corroborating sources or intelligence. In April 2002, Vanity Fair wrote an article on one of the sources, Iraqi Major General al-Assaf. This article, perhaps along with other public events involving this source, prompted two April CIA papers. The first stated that the "[t]he defector passed a DIA-administered polygraph, but the DIA debriefer expressed concem that Al- Assaf was being coached by INC [the Iraqi National Congress] to further its political agenda."55 The second report noted that "[the Defense HUMINT Service; terminated contact with al-Assaf after four sessions because of suspicions he was a fabricator." 6 Al-Assaf was determined by DIA to be a fabricator in May 2002. The agency issued a fabrication notice saying that "his information is assessed as unreliable and, in some instances, pure fabrication." 53 December 14, 2000 DCI special intelligence report, New Evidence of Continuing Iraqi Biological Warfare Program (DCINPC SIR 2000-003 X) 54 October 10, 2001 CIA WTNPAC intelligence assessment, Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Capability (CLAWINPAC IA 2001-050 X) 55 April 8, 2002, CLA SPWR, Iraqi defector in the New YorkDaily News Article, SPWR040802-01. 56 The report also noted that "The British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) also debriefed al-Assaf and assessed that he fabricated at least some of his information" but indicated that "another defector, deemed credible by the Intelligence Community, has provided more detailed information on Iraq’s development of mobile BW production facilities." April 22, 2002, CIA SPWR, Assessment ofthe Iraqi defector Cited in the Vanity Fair article on Iraqi WMD, SPWR042202-02. The first report stated that Assaf" s reporting "may be accurate" and the second stated that it was "plausible but lacks specifics." Both reports indicated that Assaf could have obtained this information from public sources. 24 (U) Despite the fabrication notice, the October 2002 Iraq WMD NIE cited four sources (not three as was included in the President’s speech the following January) of the mobile biological lab intelligence, including al-Assaf by name. (U) The October 2002 NIE said, "Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents; these facilities can evade detection and are highly survivable. Within several days these units probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total that Iraq produced in the years prior to the Gulf war." The NIE also said, "an Iraqi defector deemed credible by the IC said seven mobile BW production units were constructed and that one began production as early as l997."57 (U) Prior to the President’s address, some CIA operations officers had doubts about the credibility of CURVE BALL and debated the point at high levels within the Directorate of Operations. Additionally, on December 20, 2002, the Chief of the relevant station cabled CIA headquarters to describe a meeting that day with the head of the foreign intelligence service handling CURVE BALL. The cable summarized the meeting and noted that the head of the service wrote a letter to the DCI to the effect that CURVEBALL’s reporting on mobile facilities "has not been veriiied." The CIA station did not send the actual letter from the head of the foreign intelligence service to CIA headquarters until February 5, 2003. On January 27, 2003, the same Chief of Station cautioned CIA headquarters in another cable to "take the most serious consideration" before using CURVEBALL’s information publicly. The Committee has found no evidence that then-Director Tenet or policymakers were informed of the doubts that some Intelligence Community officers had about CURVEBALL’s reliability or about concerns with using CURVEBALL’s information publicly. Secretary of State ’s Address t0 the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) (U) Secretary Powell’s presentation delved into greater detail on Iraq’s biological weapons program and capabilities. He said there "can be no doubt" that Iraq possessed biological weapons and discussed their means for delivery. He stated that rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agent were dispersed to various locations, many of them hidden in large groves of palm trees, and moved every one to four weeks to escape detection. (U) Secretary Powell described the mobile labs in great detail. He cited sources with "iirst-hand descriptions" of the factories, and described four human sources in terms of their professions and access to the information. Powell stated that the labs — "at least seven" in number — on truck and rail cars "can produce a quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf War." (U) Secretary Powell speciiied that the mobile labs can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin, and that overall, "Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of biological agents causing diseases such as gas gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera, camelpox, and hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox." 57 The National Intelligence Council subsequently notified recipients of the NIE that the term "several days" was an error and should be replaced with "tbree to six months." 25 (U) Finally, Powell referenced human sources that told the intelligence community that Iraq had experimented with biological weapons on human beings. (U) In addition to the intelligence assessments described above, reports relevant to whether specific claims in the February 5 speech were substantiated by the intelligence are described below. (U) The DIA issued a report in February 2003, Iraq: Denial and Deception: Iraqi Countertargeting Strategy, that stated it was standard denial and deception practice for Iraq to place various military hardware in, among other things, "palm and date tree groves. . .," but this report was issued after Secretary Powe11’s speech and did not mention biological weapons. There was operational intelligence traffic on this issue prior to the Secretary’s speech, but the Committee is not aware of prior analytical assessments. (U) The number of mobile labs — "at least seven" — was included in, among other reports, the December 2000 ICA and October 2002 NIE as described above. Multiple reports described seven mobile production facilities and provided schematic details on two- or three-railcar systems. (U) Secretary Powell stated that Iraq has investigated dozens of biological agents, and named eight specifically. All eight were included, along with 13 others, in a list in the October 2002 NIE entitled, "BW Agents that Iraq has researched." A report produced by CIA WINPAC on November 13, 2002 said that "Iraq probably possesses at least 20 to 25 different microbes or toxins for possible BW use."58 The same report had noted that Iraq ‘°has the capability to produce sufficient quantities [of smallpox] for use in various delivery systems."59 Numerous other intelligence assessments discussed Iraq’s capability to produce smallpox and other biological agents. (U) On the topic of human testing, the October 2002 NIE stated that "A former Directorate of General Security officer said that 1,600 death row prisoners in 1995 were transferred "to the Haditha area" for CBW testing-—probably to the Qadisiyah complex—fi·om Baghdad prisons. Inmate transfer files &om 1995 were missing during UNSCOM inspections of the Baghdad prisons in 1998, adding weight to the source’s claim." Additional Statements • "So, we know that he has stored the biological weapons. We know that he has used chemical weapons. And we know that he has looked for ways to weaponize those and I deliver them. — National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8, 2002 58 November 13, 2002 CIA WINPAC assessment, Iraq: Biological Warfare Agents Pose Growing Threat to US Interests (CIAWINPAC IA 2002-060CX). 59 ibid. _ 26 • "But I can say obviously that they have had an enormous appetite for weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons. They’ve taken these capabilities and weaponized them. They are continuing to do so today. They are looking not only at a variety of biological capabilities, but at a variety of ways of dispensing or weaponizing them so that they have a range of choices with respect to it." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002 • "His regime has amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons, including anthrax and botulinim toxin and possibly smallpox. — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002. • "They have amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons including anthrax and possibly smallpox." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, September 27, 2002 - • "[The Iraqi declaration has] no information about Iraq’s mobile biological-weapons production facilities. And, very disturbingly, Iraq has not accounted for some two tons of anthrax growth media." — Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wob’owitz, Address to Council on Foreign Relations, January 1, 2003 • "The December 7, 2002 declaration was padded with reams of extraneous material, but failed to address scores of questions pending since 1998. It seeks to deceive when it says that Iraq has no ongoing WMD programs. Illustrative examples — but not a complete list — of Iraq’s omissions identified as issues by UNSCOM include ...tens of thousands of liters of unaccounted biological agents." — President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, January 20, 2003 • "Where is the evidence that Iraq has destroyed the tens of thousands of liters of anthrax and botulinum we know it had before it expelled the previous inspectors? This isn’t an American determination. This is the detennination of previous inspectors... What happened to the three metric tons of growth material that Iraq imported which can be used for producing early, in very rapid fashion, deadly biological agents? Where the mobile vans that are nothing more than biological laboratories on wheels?" — Secretary of State Colin Powell, remarks at the World Economic Forum, January 26, 2003 -• Firsthand witnesses have informed us that Iraq has at least seven mobile factories for the production of biological agents -— equipment mounted on trucks and rails to evade discovery. — President Bush, February 8, 2003, Radio address (U) These statements were consistent with the intelligence described above. Conclusions _ 27 (U) Conclusion 2: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq’s possession of biological agent, weapons, production capability, and use of mobile biological laboratories were substantiated by intelligence information. Intelligence assessments from the late l990s through early 2003 consistently stated that Iraq retained biological warfare agent and the capability to produce more. Assessments on the mobile facilities included the production capabilities of those labs, both in terms of type of agent and in amount. Prior to the October 2002 NIE, some intelligence assessments left open the question as to whether Iraq possessed biological weapons or that it was actively producing them, though other assessments did not present such uncertainties. Policymakers did not discuss intelligence gaps in Iraq’s biological weapons programs, which were explicit in the October 2002 NIE. Postwar Intelligence (U) The postwar review by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) determined that Iraq was not conducting biological weapons production on research after 1996.60 The ISG determined that depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks to months of a decision to do so, but found no indications that Iraq was pursuing this option.61 (U) The ISG found "no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons."62 (U) The Committee’s report, "Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments" described the postwar findings on CURVE BALL. It noted that the ISG "harbors severe doubts about the source’s credibility." The CIA and DIA issued a joint congressional notification in June 2004 noting that CURVE BALL was assessed to have fabricated his claimed access to a mobile BW production proj ect and that his reporting had been recalled.63 ET Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Biological Section, p. l. Ibid, p.2. 62 rnd. 63 CIA and DIA Congressional Affairs Notification, June 7, 2004. _ 28 IV. Chemical Weapons • "The lraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "What he wants is time and more time to husband his resources, to invest in his ongoing chemical and biological weapons programs, and to gain possession of nuclear arms." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "United Nations’ inspections also revealed that lraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, ` mustard and other chemical agents, and that the regime is rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of producing chemical weapons." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "We know that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas. Saddam Hussein also has experience in using chemical weapons. He has ordered chemical attacks on lran, and on more than forty villages in his own country. These actions killed or injured at least 20,000 people, more than six times the number of people who died in the attacks of September the 11th." — President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons, and to stop all support for terrorist groups. The lraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. lt possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons. Every chemical and biological weapon that lraq has or makes is a direct violation of the truce that ended the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Yet, Saddam Hussein has chosen to build and keep these weapons despite intemational sanctions, U.N. demands, and isolation from the civilized world." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "After eleven years during which we have tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons, and is increasing his capabilities to make more." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Twelve years ago, Saddam Hussein faced the prospect of being the last casualty in a war he had started and lost. To spare himself, he agreed to disarm of (sic) all weapons of mass destruction. For the next 12 years, he systematically violated that agreement. He pursued chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his country. Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these weapons — not 29 economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even cruise missile strikes on his military facilities. " — President George W Bush, State ofthe Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands. He’s not accounted for these materials. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them." — President George W Bush, State ofthe Union Address, January 28, 2003 • U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents. Inspectors recently turned up sixteen of them — despite Iraq’s recent declaration denying their existence. Saddam Hussein has not accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions. He’s given no evidence that he has destroyed thern." - President George W Bush, State ofthe Union Address, January 28, 2003 • "We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Under the guise of dual-use infrastructure, Iraq has undertaken an effort to reconstitute facilities that were closely associated with its past program to develop and produce chemical weapons." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Iraq’s procurement efforts include: equipment that can filter and separate A microorganisms and toxins involved in biological weapons; equipment that can be used to concentrate the agent; growth media that can be used to continue producing anthrax and botulinum toxin; sterilization equipment for laboratories; glass-lined reactors and specialty pumps that can handle corrosive chemical weapons agents and precursors; large amounts of thionyl chloride, a precursor for nerve and blister agents; and other chemicals such as sodium sulfide, an important mustard agent precursor." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets. Even the low end of 100 tons of agent would enable Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties across more than 100 square miles of territory, an area nearly five times the size of Manhattan.” - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again — against his neighbors and against his own people. And we have sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them. He wouldn’t be passing out the orders if he didn’t _ 30 _ have the weapons or the intent to use them." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "We also have sources who tell us that since the 1980s, Saddam’s regime has been experimenting on human beings to perfect its biological or chemical weapons." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 Vice President ’s Speech in Tennessee Mugust 26, 2002) (U) In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated that Iraq has been "busy enhancing its capabilities in the iield of chemical" agents and that Saddam Hussein wanted "time and more time to husband his resources [and] to invest in his ongoing chemical" weapons program. (U) The Committee reviewed prewar intelligence assessments in its July 2004 report, US. Intelligence Community 's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. That report described a December 2000 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities, which represented the iirst comprehensive, coordinated report on all aspects of Iraq’s WMD capabilities since United Nations (UN) inspectors departed Iraq. (U) The ICA stated that "Iraq’s expansion of its chemical industry is intended to support CW production" but that "we have seen no indication since the Gulf War that Iraq has engaged in large-scale production of CW agents, but we cannot rule out that small-scale production has occurred." (U) The ICA judged that "We believe that Iraq has chemical agent and stable intermediaries in bulk storage, production equipment, and iilled munitions that are still militarily useful." And that "[w]e assess the size of the CW agent stockpile to be 100 tons or less. We are uncertain about the extent and condition of Iraq’s stockpile, although we believe mustard agent- and to a lesser degree G-agents Sarin and VX — and related munitions probably are key components." The ICA noted that the available intelligence "suggests that a small portion of Iraq’s prewar stockpile of iilled munitions remains. Iraq also retains the capability to produce many types of weapons that could be filled with chemical agents." - The intelligence produced between the December 2000 ICA and the Vice President’s August 2002 speech tended to reiterate and coniim the ICA views. For example, a December 14, 2001 DLA assessment stated that "Saddam Husayn will continue to pursue a chemical weapons (CW) program to help ensure his personal survival and the survival of his regime, and to increase respect for Iraq as a regional power." It also stated that "Iraq is assessed to hold 100 metric tons of chemical agents or less in bulk storage and filled munitions."64 The same assessment noted that DLA cannot coniirm whether Iraq is currently producing chemical agents, or whether Baghdad has decided to re-establish a large—scale CW production capability. However, "we assess that Iraq has plans to re-establish such a capability." And "DL°1 judges that 64 DIA, Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Handbook, December 14, 2001 (DI-1650-57-Ol). 31 Saddam Husayn’s goal is to re-establish a robust chemical weapons (CW) progra1n." Also in December, the CIA wrote a Senior Executive Memorandum which stated that "_ - Iraq in the past several years has rebuilt a covert chemical weapons production capability by reconstructing dual-use industrial facilities and developing new chemical plans.66 (U) A January 2002 Defense Intelligence Assessment, Iraq ’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs: Post-I I September, stated "DIA cannot confirm with conidence that Iraq has successfully restarted an offensive CW program. However, if it has, Iraq probably can produce mustard, sarin or GF, and VX, though mustard may be the only agent it can produce without external resources."66 The assessment also commented on the possibility of using dual use facilities to produce chemical weapons agent, noting that "DIA cannot state with confidence the composition or total output of chemical products at (Iraq’s suspected CW) facilities, but production lines are currently operational. .. Currently, DIA cannot identify where the CW center of gravity exists, but it could be hidden in dual-use and industrial facilities." _ The question of Iraq’s production capabilities was also addressed in a May 16, 2002 CLA report, Iraq: Seeking To Expand CWProduction Capability. This report assessed that "Iraq in the past three years has sought foreign equipment and chemicals that would give it the capability to roduce chemical warfare (CW) agents for a limited strategic stockpile, according to reporting." The report went on to state that "Small-scale chemical agent production, probably of mustard, sarin, GF, and VX, could be hidden within Iraq’s legitimate chemical industry. Baghdad has the equipment and the expertise to match its pre-Gulf war production of nerve and blister agents, but Iraq’s inability to produce key precursors could limit nerve agent production."67 (U) On August l, 2002, the CIA prepared another assessment which said, "Iraq probably has rebuilt a covert CW production capability by expanding its chemical industry. It is rebuilding former CW facilities, developing new chemical plants, and trying to procure CW-related items covertly. We judge it has the capability to produce mustard blister agent and the nerve agents sarin, GF, and VX. Iraq’s CW agent production capability probably is more limited than it was at the time of the Gulf war.68 (U) Thus while the intelligence community believed that the Iraqi regime had retained some chemical weapons and had worked to develop the capability to produce new chemical weapons at unknown levels within its civilian chemical infrastructure. The Intelligence Community had not reached conclusions on whether Iraq had actually begun production of chemical weapons. President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) 65 CIA, SPWR, The Iraqi Threat, December 15, 2001 (SPWRl2l50l-07). 66 DIA, Iraq ’s Weapons of Mass Destruction and Theater Ballistic Missile Programs.· Post-!] September, January 2002 (DI- l 600-50Q-02-SCI). 67 CIA SEIB, Iraq: Seeking T 0 Expand C WPr0ducti0n Capability, May I6, 2002 (PASS SEIB 02-l l4 CHX). 68 CIA, Iraq: Expanding WMD Capabilities Post Growing Threat, August l, 2002. 32 _ (U) In the President’s September 2002 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that UN inspections "revealed that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical agents." This statement was consistent with the statements and intelligence above. (U) The President’s statement that Iraq was "rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of "` producing chemical weapons" suggests more conidence in Iraq’s progress than the intelligence assessments at the time. Ir1 addition to the reports described earlier, a July 22, 2002 CIA assessment noted that "Iraq has rebuilt destroyed CW-related and civilian facilities while building a number of new, ostensibly civilian chemical production facilities. Although CIA does not know the function of these new facilities, chemical precursors and, in some cases, agent production could be conducted at dual-use chemical facilities.69 An April 2002 CIA paper noted that "Iraq has obtained technical and logistical support to rehabilitate its industrial chemical industry and potentially to rebuild its CW program. Most ... assistance has involved the reconstruction of the chlorine facility at Al Tareq. Al Tareq probably is still connected to Iraq’s CW program and could be converted quickly to CW precursor production."70 (U) The September DIA report had written on this topic that "Iraq retains all the chemicals and equipment to produce the blister agent mustard but its ability for sustained production of G—series nerve agents and VX is constrained by its stockpile of key chemical precursors and by the destruction of all known CW production facilities during Operation Desert Storm and during subsequent UNSCOM inspections. In the absence of external aid, Iraq will likely experience difiiculties in producing nerve agents at the rate executed before Operation Desert Storm" and that "Baghdad is rebuilding part of its chemical production infrastructure under the guise of a civilian need for pesticides, chlorine, and other legitimate chemical products, giving Iraq the potential for a small ‘breakout’ production capability."71 President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October 7, 2002) (U) The President discussed chemical weapons in greater detail at his Cincinnati speech of October 2002. He stated that "we know" that Iraq "has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas" and that Iraq has used chemical weapons before. The President stated that the Iraqi regime "possesses and produces chernical" weapons. He cited "surveillance photos" of rebuilding at facilities that had previously been used to produce chemical weapons. (U) A September 2002 DIA report stated that "There is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where Iraq has —-or will--establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities." The same report, however, also said that "Iraq likely has resumed some chemical and biological agent production, but we lack conclusive proof due to Iraq’s effective national-level denial and deception (D&D) program."72 69 Iraq: Ensuring CBW Survivability, July 22, 2002, p.2. 70 Iraq: Chemical Warfare Program Profiting From Equipment and Chemical Transfers, April 2002, p. l. 71 The DIA included similar language in a November 2002 report described later in this report. 72 DIA, Iraq - Key WMD Facilities - An Operational Support Study 2900-51 l-02, September 2002. 33 (U) Intelligence community products clearly stated that Iraq had produced large volumes of chemical agents in the past, during and after its war with Iran. The intelligence community also agreed that Iraq had used chemical weapons before, against Iran in the 1980s and against Iraqi Kurds. As stated above, intelligence products prior to this speech but before the October 2002 NIE assessed that Iraq possessed chemical weapons - 100 metric tons of chemical agents or less in bulk storage and filled munitions. Director Tenet’s testimony to Senate Committees in September 2002 stated that "We assess that Iraq retains a stockpile of at least 100 tons of agent" but did not state an upper end for the estimate.7 (U) Between the President’s September speech to the UN and the October speech in Cincirmati, the intelligence community had produced and disseminated its October 2002 NIE on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. In most respects, the NIE’s judgments were more assertive than previous intelligence judgments, stating that "We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX." (U) On the question of chemical weapons stockpile, the NIE updated the previous assessment- 100 tons or less — to an assessment that "Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents—much of it added in the last year." A footnote in the body of the report added that the 100 ton figure was a "conservative estimate" and that the "500-ton upper-end estimate takes into account practical bounds .... " In saying that Iraq "has produced thousands of tons" of agent, the President did not give the time frame for this production or say that Iraq had this volume of agent stockpiled. The intelligence at the time did not suggest that Iraq had produced — or was producing such quantities at the time of the speech, though Iraq had produced such quantities since the inception of its chemical weapons program. The NIE didn’t specifically state how much chemical agent Iraq could produce. It did state that "Iraq’s CW capability probably is more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent shelf life probably have been improved." - the intelligence community had produced reports on construction and activity at suspected chemical weapons facilities, in particular the Fallujah plants. These plants also had legitimate dual-use purposes for producing chlorine, but the intelligence community assessed that plants were producing more chemicals than were needed for civilian purposes. The NIE noted that Iraq’s legitimate needs were being met through authorized imports and other chlorine plants in the country, and listed other reasons to be skeptical that the plant was being used for legitimate purposes.74 President ’s State ofthe Union Address (January 28, 2003) 73 Testimony of Director George Tenet to the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 17, 2002. 74 October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. The other reasons were: a concern about the plant’s cover story, shallow burial of equipment for denial and deception purposes, Iraq’s use of its procurement network to obtain chemical weapons precursors, and that personnel identified with the previous weapons program were linked to the facility. _ 34 (U) In the President’s State ofthe Union Address in January 2003, he said nothing has restrained Saddam Hussein from his pursuit of chemical weapons (along with other WMD). He cited intelligence estimates that Hussein "had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent" and a former stockpile of "upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents” that had not been accounted for. A _ (U) As described above, the October 2002 NIE stated that Iraq had, as an upper limit, 500 tons on chemical agent and that Iraq had renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX. (U) A November 2002 DIA report had stated that "Baghdad probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons and possibly as much as 500 metric tons of CW agents -- much of it added in the last year.” That same report also contrasted with the NIE’s judgment that "Baghdad has begtm renewed production” of certain CW agents, saying that "No reliable information indicates whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, or where the country has — or will — establish its chemical agent production facilities." The report also stated, however, that "Iraq probably has resumed some chemical and biological agent production, but no conclusive proof is available because of the effective national-level denial and deception program.”75 (U) The Intelligence Community regularly reported that Iraq had not accounted for its previous chemical weapons or precursor stockpiles and that Iraq retained a large number of munitions capable of delivering chemical weapons. The NIE stated that "Iraq provided little verifiable evidence that it unilaterally destroyed 15,000 artillery rockets after the Gulf war." (U) The reference to 30,000 (empty) chemical agent munitions was based on UNSCOM reporting. The Intelligence Community had provided assessments to policymakers in December 2002 and January 2003 on Iraq’s WMD declarations. One assessment stated that "[The declaration] fails to address unaccounted chemical munitions disputed by the UN, including 550 155mm mustard filled artillery shells or 30,000 empty CW munitions."76 Another, provided by the CIA in advance of Secretary Powell’s speech, stated that, "Baghdad did not account for 30,000 empty prewar munitions, which leaves us concerned that Iraq retained a supply for later filling with CW agents."77 Secretary of State ’s Address t0 the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) (U) Secretary Powell’s February 2003 speech repeated many of the statements addressed above. He stated that ‘%zve know Iraq has embedded key portions" of a chemical weapons program into its civilian industry and reconstituted facilities associated with its past weapons program. Secretary Powell addressed the intelligence on Iraq’s stockpile as had been done in speeches described above, saying that "[o]ur conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent." 75 DLA, Iraq’s Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapon and Missile Programs: Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities DI-1569-44-02, November 2002. 76 US Analysis of Iraq’s Declaration, 7 December 2002. 77 CLA input for Powell speech, provided to the White House in mid-January 2003. _ 35 (U) Also described in this statement but not the others previously addressed, Secretary Powell referenced human sources who said that Saddam Hussein had authorized field commanders to use chemical weapons. He also referred to sources claims that Saddam Hussein’s regime had experimented on hmnan beings as part of its chemical weapons program. (U) As described above, the October 2002 NIE assessed that 100 tons of chemical weapons agent was a "conservative estimate" and that Iraq could possess "possibly as much as 500 MT." A footnote to the NIE elaborated that the Intelligence Community believed that "the Iraqis are capable of producing significantly larger quantities of CQ agent in some scenarios; the 500-ton upper-end estimate takes into account practical bounds, such as Iraq’s limited delivery options, and approximates Iraq’s stocks at the time of Operation Desert Storm."78 According to the Comrnittee’s first report, analysts believed that the 500 ton figure was meant as an upper bound, and not as an estimate of Iraq’s stockpile.79 (U) In two places, the October 2002 NIE states that Saddam Hussein had delegated the authority to use chemical weapons to "corps-level commanders" at the end of the Iran-Iraq war or shortly anerwards. (U) On the topic of human testing, the October 2002 NIE stated that "A former Directorate of General Security officer said that 1,600 death row prisoners in 1995 were transferred "to the Haditha area" for CBW testing—probably to the Qadisiyah complex—from Baghdad prisons. Inmate transfer files from 1995 were missing during UNSCOM inspections of the Baghdad prisons in 1998, adding weight to the source’s claim.”80 Other Statements • There’s no doubt that he has chemical weapon stocks. We destroyed some after the Gulf War with the inspection regime, but there’s no doubt in our mind that he still has chemical weapon stocks and he has the capacity to produce more chemical weapons. — Secretary of State Colin Powell, Fox News Sunday, September 8, 2002. • "So, we know that he has stored the biological weapons. We know that he has used chemical weapons. And we know that he has looked for ways to weaponize those and deliver them. — National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Late Edition, September 8, 2002 7* me at 28. 79 SSCI report at 206. 80 Additional reporting on human experimentation was in a CIA SPWR (Senior Publish When Ready), Possible Experimentation on Prisoners, December 30, 2002, which reported that "Baghdad is experimenting on prisoners with toxic substances" and that Iraq had used prisoners for biological and chemical agent testing in the 1980s and 1990s. _ 36 • “His regime has amassed large clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons, including VX and sarin and mustard gas." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2002. • “He’s got chemical weapons; he needs to get rid of them, all of them." — President George W Bush, Remarks in Houston, Texas, September 26, 2002. • "They have amassed large clandestine stocks of biological weapons including anthrax and possibly smallpox. They have amassed large clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons including VX and sarin and mustard gas. His regime has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, September 27, 2002 • "His regime has large, unaccounted for stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons - including VX, sarin, mustard gas, anthrax, botulism, and possibly smallpox - and he has an active program to acquire and develop nuclear weapons." — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Remarks to ROA, January 20, 2003 • "The December 7, 2002 declaration was padded with reams of extraneous material, but failed to address scores of questions pending since 1998. It seeks to deceive when it says that Iraq has no ongoing VVMD programs. Illustrative examples — but not a complete list — of Iraq’s omissions identified as issues by UNSCOM include: 550 artillery munitions filled with mustard agent; tons of unaccounted for chemical weapons precursors; 30,000 empty chemical munitions; tens of thousands of liters of unaccounted biological agents." — President George W Bush, Report on Matters Relevant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, January 20, 2003 • "What happened to nearly 30,000 munitions capable of carrying chemical agents? Saddam should tell the truth, and tell the truth now. The more we wait, the more chance there is for this dictator with clear ties to terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida, more time for him to pass a weapon, share a technology, or use these weapons again." — Secretary of State Colin Powell, remarks at the World Economic Forum, January 26, 2003 (U) These statements were consistent with the intelligence described above. Conclusions (U) Conclusion 3: Statements in the major speeches analyzed, as well additional statements, regarding Iraq’s possession of chemical weapons were substantiated by intelligence information. hitelligence assessments, including the December 2000 ICA stated that Iraq had retained up to 100 metric tons of its chemical weapons stockpile. The October 2002 NIE provided a range of 100 to 500 metric tons of chemical weapons. _ 37 (U`) Conclusion 4: Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq’s chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reilect the intelligence community’s uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing. The intelligence community assessed that Saddam Hussein wanted to have chemical weapons production capability and that Iraq was seeking to hide such capability in its dual use chemical industry. Intelligence assessments, especially prior to the October 2002 NIE, clearly stated that analysts could not confrrm that production was ongoing. Postwar Findings (U`) The Committee reported on postwar findings on Iraq’s chemical weapons program in its September 2006 report, Postwar Findings about Iraq ’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments. The Committee found the following. (U`) Following the war, the Iraq Survey Group conducted its review of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and found that there "were no caches of CW munitions and no single rounds of CW munitions." Additionally, "the ISG has high confidence that there are no CW present in the Iraqi inventory."8l Some pre-1991 chemical weapons munitions have been found since the end of the combat operations. (U`) The ISG found no credible evidence indicating Iraq resumed its chemical weapons program after 1991, but said that "Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable."82 (U`) The ISG investigated whether Iraq had intended to produce chemical weapons through its civilian chemical industry. It found that Iraq had an inherent capability to use its civilian industry for sulfur mustard CW agents, but did not find any production units that had been configured to produce CW agents or key chemical precursors. The ISG found that Iraq did not have a capability to produce nerve agents.83 gl Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Chemical Section at p. 123. 82 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Chemical Section at p. land 97. 83 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Chemical Section at p. 25. _ 38 V. Weapons of Mass Destruction • "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us." - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "As former Secretary of State Kissinger recently stated: ‘The imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejection of a viable inspection system, and the demonstrated hostility of Saddam Hussein combine to produce an imperative for preemptive action."’ - Vice President Richard Cheney, Nashville, Tennessee, August 26, 2002 • "And our greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with the technologies to kill on a massive scale. In one place — in one regime — we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to confiont." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger. To suggest otherwise is to hope against the evidence." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "But Saddam Hussein has defied all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass destruction. The first time we may be completely certain he has a - nuclear weapons is when, God forbids, he uses one." - President George W Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002 • "If we know that Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today — and we do- does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?" - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "Saddam is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of death and destruction." - President George W Bush, Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002 • "From intelligence sources we know, for instance, that thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work hiding documents and materials fiom the UN inspectors, sanitizing inspection sites and monitoring the inspectors themselves." - President George W Bush, State ofthe Union Address, January 29, 2002 • "Indeed, the facts and Iraq’s behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 _ 39 • "Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving not just documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction, to keep them from being found by inspectors." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 • "VVe also have satellite photos that indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities." - Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address t0 the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003 (U) In major policy speeches the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of State all stated that the Iraqi government possessed weapons of mass destruction. In later speeches, both the President and the Secretary of State said that the Iraqi government was engaged in a large- scale deception effort to conceal weapons of mass destruction programs from United Nations inspectors. (U) Scope Note: The term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (or ‘WMD’) is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and this is the official Department of Defense definition.84 No official definition existed for the intelligence community at the time of the speeches being examined, and different intelligence products have used different definitions. A substantial number of policymaker statements regarding Iraq referred generally to ‘weapons of mass destruction"‘, without specifying whether the weapons in question were nuclear, biological, chemical, or some combination thereof. This section examines statements that refer generally to ‘weapons of mass destruction’, and compares them to intelligence regarding these three types of weapons. Statements regarding specific types of weapons are discussed in the other, corresponding sections of this report. Vice President’s Speech in Tennessee (August 26, 2002) (U) In the Vice President’s August 2002 speech on Iraq, he stated that "there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction," and that "there is no doubt he is amassing them". He also quoted a former Secretary of State referencing "the imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" with regard to Iraq, and "the huge dangers it involves", as evidence that preemptive action was necessary.85 (U) As noted, the term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ is commonly used to refer collectively to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The intelligence community never assessed that Iraq 84 Discussions of WMD frequently include references to ballistic missiles and other WMD delivery systems, but delivery systems by themselves are specifically excluded from the official Department of Defense definition. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms dennes "weapons of mass destruction" as "Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high-yield explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon." 85 White House Transcript, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention, August 26, 2002. 40 possessed nuclear weapons, but reached different conclusions about chemical and biological weapons.86 (U) In the late 1990s and early 2000s the intelligence community had consistently assessed that Iraq possessed remnants from its previous biological weapons stockpile. Some reporting also assessed that Iraq had an active biological weapons program, and that production of biological weapons was ongoing.87 (U) During this same time frame, intelligence assessments noted that Iraq maintained a small stockpile of pre-Gulf War chemical weapons. Some assessments stated that Iraq had developed the capability to produce new chemical weapons at unknown levels within its civilian chemical infrastructure, while other assessments were not conclusive on this point. The Intelligence Community had not reached conclusions about whether Iraq had actually begun production of chemical weapons.88 (U) The intelligence community’s assessments regarding Iraqi possession and production of chemical and biological weapons remained consistent until the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. President’s Speech to the UN General Assembly (September 12, 2002) (U) In the President’s September 2002 address to the United Nations General Assembly, he stated that Saddam Hussein’s regime was a "grave and gathering danger", and "continues to develop weapons of mass destruction." He did not state that Iraq possessed or produced weapons of mass destruction at that time.89 (U) Several intelligence assessments discussed Iraq’s development of "weapons of mass destruction" generally. While not from a iinished intelligence product, a briefing book prepared by the CLA in May 2002 for the Prirrcipals’ Committee of the National Security Council said that "Iraq’s activities since 1998 clearly show that it has repaired and expanded dual-use WMD facilities, increased WMD production capabilities, and advanced clandestine production and procurement? As of September 2002, intelligence community assessments stated that Iraq had worked to rebuild a chemical weapons production capacity within its civilian industry but did not state that production was ongoing. The intelligence community also assessed that Iraq maintained the capability to produce biological weapons, and the CLA assessed that production was ongoing.9° 86 A summary of the intelligence community’s assessments regarding nuclear weapons and Iraq can be found in the Nuclear Weapons section of this report. 87 A summary of the intelligence community’s assessments regarding biological weapons and Iraq can be found in the Biological Weapons section of this report. 88 A summary of the intelligence community’s assessments regarding chemical weapons and Iraq can be found in the Chemical Weapons section of this report. 89 White House Transcript, President ’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly. 90 National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001; CIA Iraq Seeking To Expand C WProduction Capacity, May 16, 2002; DIA Iraq: Biological Warfare Program Handbook. _ 41 (U) The intelligence community did not publish a coordinated community judgment that Iraq had begtm to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program until October 2002. I However, as discussed in the Nuclear Weapons section of this report, by September 2002 both the CIA and the DIA concluded that reconstitution had begun.92 President’s Speech in Cincinnati (October Z 2002) (U) In the President’s speech on Iraq in Cincinnati, he stated that "we lcnow that Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today" and that "Saddam is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of death and destruction." He also implied that Saddam was likely to develop "even more dangerous weapons."93 (U) The October 2002 NIE assessed with high levels of confidence that Iraq possessed both chemical and biological weapons and was continuing with active production programs. This represented a shift from previous intelligence community assessments, which concluded that Iraq probably possessed a small stockpile of chemical weapons and biological weapons. Previous community assessments did not judge that Iraq was actively producing chemical weapons, and had lower confidence that biological weapons production was ongoing. Intelligence agencies did not agree on the question of whether Baghdad was attempting to reconstitute its nuclear program, but the majority view of the NIE (which all agencies except State/INR supported) concluded that reconstitution had begun, and that Iraq would probably be able to produce a nuclear weapon in the next five to seven years.94 President’s State ofthe Union Address (January 29, 2003) (U) In the President’s 2003 State of the Union Address, he stated that "thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work hiding documents and materials from the UN inspectors, sanitizing inspection sites, and monitoring the inspectors themselves."95 (U) As of January 2003, the intelligence community had not produced a coordinated assessment regarding the Iraqi government’s response to the ongoir1g UNMOVIC inspections. However, both the CIA and the DIA had produced multiple reports suggesting that active deception efforts were underway, and that these efforts ir1cluded sanitizing weapons facilities as well as concealing 91 The 2002 NIE represented the first collective intelligence community assessment on this topic since the December 2001 NIE, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015. The December 2001 NIE was consistent with previous assessments that Iraq did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. 92 National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq 's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002; Defense Intelligence Assessment Iraq 's Reemerging Nuclear Weapons Program, September 2002; CIA Iraq: Expanding WILID Capabilities Pose Growing Threat, August 2002. 93 White House Transcript, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, October 7, 2002. 94 Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq.· Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities, December 2000; National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq ’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 2002. 95 White House Transcript, President Delivers "State ofthe Union ", January 28, 2003. 42 documents and other evidence. The reports generally did not describe the number of Iraqis involved in these apparent efforts with any speciiicity.96 Secretary of State ’s Address to the UN Security Council (February 5, 2003) (U) In the Secretary of State’s February 5, 2003 address to the United Nations Security Council, he said that the Iraqi regime was actively concealing "efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction." He stated that numerous hrunan sources had reported that Iraqis were concealing "not just documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction" from UN inspectors. He said that satellite photos "indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities."9' (U) A coordinated Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) from February 2003, entitled Iraq 's Denial and Deception Capabilities judged that Iraq successfully employed a number of denial and deception techniques against UN inspectors and US intelligence agencies. The ICA stated that these techniques included moving prohibited materials and evidence among multiple "hide sites", and that this conclusion was based on reporting from human sources and "defector testimony". The ICA also included recent satellite imagery of a storage facility that "showed the removal of possible chemical munitions from this site, almost certainly to thwart the UNMOVIC inspections conducted there."98 Additional Statements • "Every world leader that comes to see me, I explain our concerns about a nation which is not conforming to agreements that it made in the past; a nation which has gassed her people in the past; a nation which has weapons of mass destruction and apparently is not afraid to use them." —President George W Bush, Press Conkrence, March I3, 2002 • "And [Saddam Hussein] is a man who refuses to allow us to determine whether or not he still has weapons of mass destruction, which leads me to believe he does. He is a dangerous man who possesses the world’s most dangerous weapons". — President George W Bush, Press Conference, March 22, 2002 • "Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use them against our friends, against our allies and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors; confrontations that 96Iraq.· Bolstering Ejjbrts to Deceive Inspectors, November 30, 2002; CIA, Iraq: Moving C WInto Underground Facilities, December 17, 2002; DIA Executive Highlight, Iraq: Reports of Iraq concealing experts on weapons of mass destruction increased notably during the past week January 6, 2003; CIA, Iraq: Undermining WMD Inspections, January 6, 2003; DIA Executive Highlight, Iraq: The Iraqi Intelligence Service has taken on an increased role in concealment of Iraq 's weapons of mass destruction experts, January 9, 2003. 97 White House Transcript, US. Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses the UN Security Council, February 5, 2003. 98 Intelligence Community Assessment, Iraq 's Denial and Deception Capabilities, February 2003. _ 43 will involve both the weapons that he has today and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth. ... In the face of such a threat, we must proceed with care, deliberation and in consultation with our allies. ...W`hat we must not do in the face of a mortal threat is to give in to wishful thinking or to willful blindness.’ — Vice President Dick Cheney, Statement before the Veterans ofthe Korean War, San Antonio, Texas, August, 29, 2002 • "l’m deeply concerned about a leader who has ignored all -- who ignored the United Nations for all these years, has refused to confor